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ABSTRACT  
While many outsourcing contracts are expiring, and vendor transition is becoming an increasing concern, little 
research helps organizations manage vendor transition.  This paper explores vendor transition across two case sites.  
In one case, the outgoing vendor cooperated with the client which resulted in the client distancing itself from 
interactions between vendors.  In the second case, the outgoing vendor was openly hostile, with the result that the 
client allied with the incoming vendor to manage vendor transition.  These findings mirror expectations from 
balance of threat theory, a political science theory about interactions between nations.  Balance of threat theory 
predicts that outgoing vendor hostility and the capability of the client to mitigate hostility determine whether a client 
takes a hard or soft balancing strategy during vendor transition.   
Keywords  
Outsourcing, vendor transition, balance of threat, power 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost all of the substantial research on outsourcing explores the client’s interaction with the initial vendor.  
However, IT outsourcing is now a mature industry, generating exchanges of over USD 200 billion in value (Whitten 
and Leidner, 2006).  Given the field’s maturity, one emerging trend is vendor transition, where client organizations 
switch from existing to new vendors. Studies suggest that between 35 and 47% of outsourced contracts are expected 
to be re-tendered (Willcocks and Lacity, 2006).   
Vendor transition is a problem with many facets, including: 
• Transfer of physical and intellectual assets between transitioning vendors.  Being competitors, the transfer of 
resources between the outgoing (i.e., incumbent) and incoming (i.e., new) vendor presents a series of challenges 
not present in traditional outsourcing arrangements. Technologies, tools, business processes, intellectual 
properties and knowledge have to be transferred between vendors, not just between client and vendor.  Pure 
monetary reward may encourage cooperation in traditional outsourcing; but in vendor transition, the outgoing 
vendor is reluctant to transfer assets to the incoming vendor. Such assets (eg. source code) often provide the 
outgoing vendor with competitive advantage in other contracts.   
• Transfer of personnel between transitioning vendors. Knowledge of the client and the outsourced processes is 
often tacit, and resides with outgoing vendor personnel. A quick way to transfer such critical tacit knowledge is 
for the incoming vendor to hire staff from the outgoing vendor’s team. However, the outgoing vendor is likely to 
block such transfers as it decreases the competitiveness of the outgoing vendor vis-à-vis the incoming one.   
• Outsourcing legacy. Unlike in an initial outsourcing condition, there is a legacy between the outgoing vendor and 
client.  First, there may be existing contractual obligations.  Given that vendors are generally more savvy than 
first-time clients, the initial outsourcing contract tends heavily to favor the vendor (Saunders, et al., 1997).  These 
contracts limit client behavior (Natovich, 2003).  For example, source code developed to support client operations 
could be the intellectual property of the outgoing vendor.   
Second, the outgoing vendor often has privileged access.  For example, the outgoing vendor may have access to 
sensitive client data (Adler, 2003).  Given that ill-will is often present in vendor transitions (Kern and Blois, 
2002), and the risk of vendor opportunism is high (Bahli and Rivard, 2003), this vulnerability is a risk the client 
must address.   
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• Time Horizon. Once the outgoing vendor’s contract expires, the outgoing vendor leaves, regardless of whether the 
incoming vendor is prepared to take on the responsibility.  During the period of vendor transition, the client must 
ensure business continuity is maintained even though proficient outgoing vendor employees are being replaced by 
unfamiliar incoming vendor ones.   
• Knowledge Transfer and Client Personnel Management. Clients who are knowledgeable about outsourced 
business processes and operations can serve as a bridge between the transitioning vendors. However, the client has 
usually lost the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the outsourced operation and may no longer have the 
absorptive capacity to relearn knowledge and skills (Clark Jr., et al., 1995, Hancox and Hackney, 2000).  The 
client often does not maintain sufficient engagement with the outsourced operations to retain necessary skills. 
Vendor transition is therefore complex and poses very real problems.  However, to our knowledge, no work has 
suggested strategies that managers should employ during the process of transitioning from one vendor to another.  
The objective of this research is to explore and identify effective strategies client managers could employ during the 
vendor transition process.   
METHODOLOGY 
Given the paucity of research, we adopted an exploratory cross-case approach.  Exploratory case analysis allows one 
to obtain an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon.  We selected two vendor transition projects as revelatory 
cases (Yin, 2003).  
To our knowledge, no research has investigated the actual transition of vendors in an IT context, hence an 
exploratory approach involving revelatory cases is ideal.  Both vendor transitions completed successfully.  However, 
in one case, the outgoing vendor and client parted on amicable terms.  In the second, the outgoing vendor was 
hostile to the client.  
Case 1 involved a non-hostile outgoing vendor.  The case focuses on the transition between vendors during a large 
enterprise resource planning system project in a large Asian logistics organization, Logistico.  The company 
employed two separate vendors to be responsible for individual phases of implementation. The outgoing vendor 
performed analysis and design for three subsidiaries and implementation for one subsidiary.  Due to resource 
constraints on the part of the outgoing vendor, and the client’s desire to avoid lock-in, the implementation contract 
for the two remaining subsidiaries was opened to tender.  The incoming vendor successfully implemented the 
system for the two remaining subsidiaries. 
Case 2 was a high threat vendor transition context involving a public organization’s (Publico) online portal and 
customer call center. The vendors shared a more adversarial relationship as the organization expressed 
dissatisfaction with the outgoing vendor and felt it was not sufficiently innovative in managing the portal.  The client 
chose not to extend its contract with the incumbent, and opted for an open tender.  Although the client was less 
familiar with the systems and processes than in case 1, the incoming vendor successfully took over the portal. 
We obtained comprehensive access to written project documentation and conducted interviews with key 
stakeholders representing the client, incoming and outgoing vendor for both cases.  Interviews were always 
conducted by multiple interviewers and transcribed within 24 hours.   In keeping with Pettigrew’s (1990) 
suggestions, we focused on identifying temporal relationships between actions. We specifically examined the 
client’s perception of the outgoing vendor, the client’s corresponding strategy, and the impact of the strategy on the 
five issues associated with vendor transition (i.e., transfer of physical and intellectual assets, transfer of personnel, 
outsourcing legacy, the time horizon, and knowledge transfer and client personnel management). 
DATA 
Case 1 
This case revolved around a massive information system implemented to replace three separate systems developed 
for three subsidiaries (A, B and C) in Logistico.  A major consulting firm was contracted to design the information 
system and implement it for subsidiary A.  Near the end of the implementation for subsidiary A, senior management 
opened tender on the implementation for B and C.  They reasoned that a change in vendor could protect Logistico 
against vendor lock-in and the implementation should be relatively effortless as the design was already completed, 
and any vendor ‘worth his salt’ could implement it. 
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Perception of outgoing vendor.  The outgoing vendor had signed a contract valued in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars and had about 50 capable individuals full-time on site.  These people had been on site for at least a year.  
Some had been on hand since the inception of the project two years before.  Given the size of the contract and extent 
of vendor involvement with the project, the vendor had some capacity to disrupt vendor transition.  However, 
Logistico was not overly concerned for two reasons.  First, client personnel had worked closely with the vendor to 
draft requirements.   
Second, the outgoing vendor’s expressed intent had been positive.  For example, according to the contract, the 
outgoing vendor’s warranty clause ended in August.  Vendor personnel stayed on site to help until November, 
despite the fact the outgoing vendor had lost the contract in April. 
We’re happy they stayed around to close issues even after being paid.  And we all knew.  [Outgoing 
vendor] did their job.  [Outgoing vendor] stayed around until November.  The warranty ran out end 
August.  (Logistico project manager) 
Client Strategy.  Given that the outgoing vendor was viewed as relatively benign, Logistico’s strategy during 
vendor transition was to distance itself from vendor transition issues.  In many instances, the client abrogated 
responsibility for decisions affecting both vendors.  Instead of mandating a decision, the client desired vendors to 
resolve issues between themselves.  Some cross-vendor disputes arose.  For example, when the new vendor insisted 
that one of the processes designed by the outgoing vendor could not be implemented, the client brought third parties 
to arbitrate instead of directly intervening and resolving the issue itself.  
The client sought to maintain a neutral stance between the vendors, even though one would naturally expect the 
client to be more concerned about the relationship with the incoming vendor. In fact, the relationship between the 
client and outgoing vendor was better than the relationship with the incoming vendor during the transition. The 
outgoing vendor had worked closely with the client during design and initial implementation, and so people on the 
ground had formed close bonds.  The client and new vendor were still unfamiliar with each other. 
In [first implementation] between [corporate IT] and [outgoing vendor], we had intense discussion but (it 
was) still (workable).  It’s quite cold between [corporate IT] and [incoming vendor].  (Logistico project 
manager) 
Transfer of physical and intellectual assets.  The outgoing vendor also was open to knowledge transfer, subject to 
the condition that the incoming vendor would not compromise on the outgoing vendor’s rights and prerogatives.  
For example, the outgoing vendor’s contract included a warranty clause.  The outgoing vendor allowed the incoming 
vendor full access to the source code, so long as the incoming vendor did not tamper with it and therefore void the 
warranty. 
Transfer of personnel.  The client tried to respect the rights and prerogatives of the outgoing vendor, and made no 
attempt to “unfairly” obtain vendor personnel.  For example, the incoming vendor wanted to hire some outgoing 
vendor staff as this provided immediate “grafting” of personalized knowledge.  The outgoing vendor refused, 
because its staff had signed a non-competition clause.  The client did not challenge the clause’s legality. 
Outsourcing Legacy.  Perhaps because the client continued to deal with the outgoing vendor on friendly terms, the 
outgoing vendor made no attempt to invoke contract provisions beneficial to the outgoing vendor, or exploit its 
access to client data.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the outgoing vendor provided extra support by helping to run and 
maintain the system during vendor transition.  Logistico was grateful to the outgoing vendor, but was not too 
surprised.  As one Logistico IT manager noted: 
In the IT industry, the top level know one another. They really work on a co-opetition model.  [They could 
be] competing on one project, but could be working together for another bid. 
Time Horizon.  While vendor transition occurred successfully, the client’s hands-off approach threatened the 
success of vendor transition.  Several cross-vendor disputes were never satisfactorily resolved during the handover. 
For example, during the handover, project documentation was not in good shape.  Many documents were not 
updated to reflect the current status of the system. 
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In preparation for upstream work, we realized the documentation was not in good shape. It was not 
organized.  They had no strict document control, like a library, to keep track of key events. It was far from 
there.  (Incoming vendor project manager) 
It should be emphasized that the poor documentation was not the sole fault of the outgoing vendor.  Both the 
outgoing vendor and client were responsible for documentation, but documentation had been a low priority for both, 
as the focus had been on ensuring the system was successfully running for subsidiary A.  However, the client never 
pushed the outgoing vendor strongly to update the documentation.  As a result, the incoming vendor had to rely on 
source code to understand prior work.  
Knowledge Transfer and Personnel Management.  Knowledge transfer from outgoing vendor to client was not a 
significant issue as the client had involved itself heavily during all stages of the project during the outgoing vendor’s 
implementation.  The client was cognizant of the requirements, and was familiar with the design.   
Post Vendor Transition. The incoming vendor completed implementation for subsidiaries B and C on time in April 
2006 and 2007 respectively.  The outgoing vendor left such a positive impression on the client that the client invited 
the outgoing vendor to bid on another project valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  The outgoing vendor 
bid, and successfully won the contract. 
Case 2 
This case focused on vendor transition for an online portal maintenance contract.  Vendor transition occurred 
because the client (Publico) was unhappy with the outgoing vendor’s service.  The outgoing vendor satisfied 
contract terms.  However, the client wanted the vendor to be innovative and proactive with the website portal instead 
of only providing simple maintenance. The client acknowledged the contract did not drive such behavior: 
We didn’t have much control over the SLA [Service Level Agreement]...It was according to the minimum 
standards in the contract.  [The analogy is like] If the light bulb is working and even though it’s not very 
bright, you cannot ask [outgoing vendor] to change the light bulb because of that. It’s not in the contract. 
(PubliCo project member) 
Perception of outgoing vendor.  Publico perceived the outgoing vendor as a problem.  The outgoing vendor had 
signed a contract of about 100 million dollars and had about 50 experienced individuals full-time on site.  These 
individuals had been on site for up to five years.  Furthermore, Publico considered this a strategic application, but 
possessed no in-house portal and call center management capabilities. Not surprisingly, Publico felt vulnerable. 
Management of the outgoing vendor also exhibited antagonistic intent.  During the outgoing vendor’s tenure, its 
staff performed the bare minimum associated with the SLA.  When the contract came up for renewal, the outgoing 
vendor emphasized that moving to a new vendor would damage the client. 
They tried to frighten us with the risk of transition, which they mean it would be a disaster if we switch 
vendor. They were so confident. But they asked for the price of a Mercedes Benz but delivered a Camry. 
(User manager) 
Furthermore, once the decision to switch vendors was announced, the outgoing vendor turned difficult and evasive.  
In many cases, the client would assert its rights to some service from the outgoing vendor.  The outgoing vendor 
would present confounding factors, which forced the client to meet the outgoing vendor halfway.  For example, the 
outgoing vendor did not attend the vendor transition project meetings, resulting in delay to the project handover 
schedule.  PubliCo demanded an outgoing vendor presence in the project meetings, whereupon the outgoing vendor 
tried to identify schedule hurdles.  PubliCo responded by adjusting meetings to the outgoing vendor’s schedule. 
Client Strategy.  The client recognized the outgoing vendor was uncooperative, but that it would be difficult to 
switch.  Thus, a year before contract expiry, the client began investigating ways of switching vendors.  Once the 
client successfully switched vendors, the client allied very closely with the incoming vendor.   
For other projects, it is like ‘I-am-managing-the-vendor’ type. Here, we worked closely as partners. We 
were very open with each other. If [PubliCo] couldn’t do, we did, and vice versa. We didn’t bring in 
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contracts during meetings. The relationship is that – if you fail, I fail as well. (incoming vendor project 
director) 
Transfer of physical and intellectual assets.  The outgoing vendor laid claim to portal components including the 
portal domain name.  The vendor registered the domain name on behalf of the client.  However, the client had never 
paid back the vendor for this.   The vendor insisted on charging the client “a seven-figure sum” for the domain name.   
The client refused to pay for the domain name, and instead purchased a new one.  Unfortunately, customers did not 
know about the change, so Publico and the incoming vendor worked together to publicize that fact.  A coordinated 
effort was made to send a physical letter to every customer.  In addition, the change was advertised on radio, and a 
media blitz associated with football and karaoke (two activities strongly linked to the 18-30 year old, male 
demographic of most Publico customers) was conducted to increase awareness of the website change. The outgoing 
vendor converted the old portal to a “men’s lifestyle” website similar in respects to those of mens’ magazines. 
Transfer of personnel.  To transition successfully, the incoming vendor needed outgoing vendor call center 
personnel, since the client had little knowledge of the call center’s processes.   The incoming vendor thus poached 
call center staff.  The outgoing vendor complained about this poaching, but the client feigned ignorance.  
[Outgoing vendor CEO] was complaining that [incoming vendor] was poaching their staff. [Incoming 
vendor] did go down to [outgoing vendor] for a road show. It was in an open manner and mainly for the 
call center staff … All PubliCo wants is seamless transition (PubliCo IT manager). 
Outsourcing Legacy.  The client contract with the outgoing vendor left a lot of room for improvement.  For one, the 
contract did not specify contractual obligations on the outgoing vendor in the event of a transition.  Business 
continuity during the transition was thus in danger of disruption. 
[Outgoing vendor] doesn’t see itself having a significant flow of business from [PubliCo] from [when they 
lost the contract], so they don’t need to leave a good impression. They were pulling out resources even 
from [existing portal]. (PubliCo IT manager) 
Requests for maintenance during the transition process were generally denied.  The lack of outgoing vendor support 
meant business continuity during the transition period could never be guaranteed.  In fact, because the outgoing 
vendor laid claim to the source code, the incoming vendor had to redo the portal, essentially from scratch.  Incoming 
vendor employees worked “18 hour days,” “even coming back on Sundays” to perform this task. 
Also, both the client and outgoing vendor laid claim to the customer data.  The final resolution held that the client 
owned the customer data since the client had supplied that.  However, the outgoing vendor had ownership of the 
login IDs and passwords, as customers to the portal had provided those while creating portal accounts. 
This caused two problems.  First, all customers had to recreate their logins on the new portal when it launched.  
Second, the outgoing vendor used customer data to send newsletters about the revamped old website.  Recall that the 
revamped website’s content differed from that in the original portal. 
[Customers] also came back about the [outgoing vendor] newsletters, so we have to tell them to 
unsubscribe from [old website], and [outgoing vendor] has to make it easy for them to do so. (Publico IT 
manager) 
Knowledge Transfer and Personnel Management.  As the client no longer possessed sufficient knowledge of the 
business processes, they requested for the source code from the outgoing vendor. The incoming vendor needed the 
source code to determine requirements. The outgoing vendor laid claim to all source code and refused access.  The 
client demanded access to the source code, whereupon the outgoing vendor responded that the incoming vendor 
would be allowed to read the code, but not bring any back to the client site. 
Post Vendor Transition. Publico’s portal is active today- the first two authors are customers.  However, problems 
with vendor transition left many individuals in Publico bitter about the outgoing vendor.  The client refused to 
consider the outgoing vendor for future contracts.  Subsequently, the outgoing vendor lost other contracts with other 
dissatisfied customers and shut down.   
Chua & Lim, et al  Threat-Balancing in Vendor Transition 
eProceedings of the 3rd International Research Workshop on Information Technology Project Management (IRWITPM) 
Paris, France, December 12th– 13th, 2008  24 
DISCUSSION 
Our exploratory study suggests the appropriate strategy a client organization should take during vendor transition 
depends on the attitude of the outgoing vendor when the transition takes place.  An outgoing vendor can adopt two 
strategies.  First, it can pursue a strategy of enlightened self-interest by cooperating with the incoming vendor.  The 
client responds by taking a neutral stance in the vendor transition process to preserve the good relationship with the 
outgoing vendor.  Alternately, the outgoing vendor can pursue a hostile strategy of being uncooperative.  The client 
responds by allying with the incoming vendor to ensure vendor transition proceeds smoothly.   
The behaviors of the outgoing vendor and clients in our study parallel the way nations establish alliances to ward 
against threats as modeled in balance of threat theory (Walt, 1994; Walt, 1996).  Balance of threat theory is a realist 
theory, subscribing to the belief that nations try to survive in an anarchic environment (Waltz, 1979).   
Like nations, vendors and clients operate in an anarchic environment.  Vendors or clients could appeal to the law to 
remedy a wrong, just as nations could appeal to the United Nations.  However, the process of appeal is so long, that 
by the time the case is heard, the transition process has ended.  Thus, decisions by vendors or the client to respect 
laws or agreements are made based on strategic necessity, and not because of respect for the law.  A vendor could 
break an agreement or deliberately drop its service levels.  Similarly, a client could perform “unsavory” acts such as 
poaching vendor staff. 
In Case 1, both the vendors and client held themselves up to “the law,” because doing so met their strategic interests.  
The client could have attempted to poach outgoing vendor staff even though the outgoing vendor had non-
competition clauses.  Generally, non-competition clauses are difficult to enforce in law.   
In Case 2, the outgoing vendor did not enact its contractual obligations.  Service levels fell to unacceptable levels 
during the transition, and the vendor enacted barriers to inhibit knowledge transfer.  Similarly, the client supported 
the poaching of vendor staff. 
Balance of threat theory postulates that a nation’s long term stability and survivability comes from its ability to 
achieve a balance of power against threats. Alliances are enacted to counter nations perceived as a threat.  Threat 
perception is measured by three factors (Walt, 1996): 
• Aggressive Intent: These are the actions of the other nation.  A nation that has through words or behavior 
demonstrated hostility is viewed as having aggressive intent. 
• Aggregate Power: This is the total capability of the other nation.  It includes the population of the nation, its 
industrial level, arms expenditure, and other capabilities to fight a war or compromise another nation. 
• Offensive-Defensive Balance:  This is the ability of a nation to defend against attacks by a particular nation.  
Attacks need not require direct military confrontation, but could include propaganda, embargoes, or the severance 
of a key oil pipeline (Rose and Van Dusen, 2002).  The offensive-defensive balance takes into account such 
factors as geographical features, distance between the nations, and the relative composition of a nation’s military 
portfolio (Walt, 1994; Walt, 1996).   
Within the context of vendor transition, we translate aggressive intent as the actions of the outgoing vendor.  In case 
1, the vendor exhibited no aggressive intent.  In fact, the vendor remained onsite to support client operations without 
pay.  In case 2, the outgoing vendor exhibited aggressive intent.   
Next, aggregate power in vendor transition refers to the overall capabilities of the outgoing vendor.  In both cases, 
the outgoing vendor had about 50 individuals on site.  In Case 1, the contract was in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars, while in Case 2, the amount approached a hundred million dollars.  Both vendors thus had high aggregate 
power. 
Finally, the offensive-defensive balance considers the effect on the client if the vendor turns hostile.  In Case 1, the 
effect was moderate.  Client employees had worked with the vendor to create the design, and the source code was 
available on the client machines.  In case 2, the effect was large.  Client employees did not know anything about 
portal operations and the vendor held licenses to critical third party tools (e.g., the underlying RDBMS).  
Furthermore, the vendor held critical intellectual property necessary to the portal such as the domain name and 
ownership of the source code. 
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A nation enacts one of three strategies in response to its total assessment of the three factors identified by Waltz.  
First, if it perceives low threat, the nation will soft balance all other nations against each other.  Soft balancing refers 
to non-confrontational and indirect strategies such as reliance on international institutions like the United Nations to 
counter threats.  In soft balancing, a nation attempts to reduce the ability of another nation to harm it, without 
directly attacking the source of the other nation’s power.  As one illustration, the United States maintains the status 
quo in the Middle East by providing foreign aid to multiple Middle Eastern nations and groups (Kinsella, 1994).   
Case 1 is an illustration of soft balancing in vendor transition.  We observed three aspects to the strategy: (1) The 
client elected not to directly intervene in disputes between the two vendors.  Indeed, when pressed to mediate, the 
client instead recruited a third vendor to arbitrate.  (2) The client consciously maintained good relationships with the 
outgoing vendor.  For example, the client did not press for updated documentation, demonstrating a spirit of give 
and take that recognized that the outgoing vendor had gone the extra mile in other areas such as staying on beyond 
the warranty period. (3) The client provided incentives for the outgoing vendor to behave well, by inviting them to 
bid on another major contract. 
If a nation perceives another nation as a high threat, and perceives that there are actions it can take to block the 
threat, the nation will hard balance against the threatening nation.  Hard balancing involves two practices: (1) 
building internal capabilities and (2) forming alliances with other nations.  The goal of hard balancing is to destroy 
or reduce the source of the threatening nation’s power.   
Case 2 provides an example of hard balancing.  The client developed internal capabilities by pulling in users, 
increasing its staffing, and getting senior management attention.  The alliance with the incoming vendor was also 
close.  The client helped the incoming vendor overcome obstacles by the outgoing vendor.  For example, the client 
escorted the incoming vendor to the outgoing vendor’s site to view source code. 
The final strategy, called bandwagoning, occurs when a nation perceives another nation as a high threat, but 
perceives that there is nothing it can do to mitigate the threat.  The nation allies with the high threat nation, ceding to 
it concessions out of proportion with the benefit from the alliance (Walt, 1994). The classic example of 
bandwagoning in vendor transition is where the client renews the vendor contract despite dissatisfaction with vendor 
performance.  In case 2, a small amount of bandwagoning occurred, since the client renewed the outgoing vendor’s 
contract on a short-term basis to allow vendor transition to proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
This research is an attempt to uncover client strategies to orchestrate a successful vendor transition, which is an 
increasingly common phenomenon as global outsourcing matures. We contrast two cases of successful vendor 
transition in an attempt to understand and develop theory to help manage the phenomenon.  Our study reveals that a 
contingency-based strategy founded on balance of threat theory is one possible way of successfully transitioning 
vendors.  If a vendor transition is feasible, then in the event that the outgoing vendor is a threat, the client should 
actively court an alliance with the incoming vendor.  However, in the event where the outgoing vendor is not a 
threat, the client should disengage from the vendor transition process so as to maintain a positive relationship with 
the outgoing vendor in the future. 
While we believe the study has provided a constructive approach to client management of vendor transitions, further 
research is needed of vendor transitions in other organizations. Additional data will enable assessment of the extent 
to which client perception of the overall level of threat influences their choice of hard or soft balancing strategies. 
Further research is also needed to articulate the range of specific tactics that make up each strategy. 
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